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Autonomous Underwater Vehicle

System Requirements Specification (SyRS) — ISO/IEC/IEEE 15289 — Specification | IEEE 29148 §6.2–6.4
Generated 2026-03-27 — UHT Journal / universalhex.org

Referenced Standards

StandardTitle
IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems
SOLAS
SOLAS LSA Code requirements for EPIRBs and accounts for worst

Acronyms & Abbreviations

AcronymExpansion
ARC Architecture Decisions
CCCS Completeness, Consistency, Correctness, Stability
EARS Easy Approach to Requirements Syntax
IFC Interface Requirements
STK Stakeholder Requirements
SUB Subsystem Requirements
SYS System Requirements
UHT Universal Hex Taxonomy
VER Verification Plan

Stakeholder Requirements (STK)

RefRequirementV&VTags
STK-OPS-001 The Autonomous Underwater Vehicle SHALL execute pre-programmed survey missions autonomously for a minimum of 24 hours without operator intervention.
Rationale: Deep-sea survey operations require extended autonomous operation because acoustic communication bandwidth (1kbps) is insufficient for real-time piloting, and surface vessel time is the primary cost driver at £25k/day. 24-hour minimum enables single-dive coverage of typical survey blocks (10km x 2km at 3 knots).
Demonstration stakeholder, session-315
STK-OPS-002 The Autonomous Underwater Vehicle SHALL surface autonomously and activate recovery aids within 120 seconds of detecting any fault condition that could result in vehicle loss.
Rationale: AUV replacement cost exceeds £2M and loss at 6000m depth makes recovery impractical. Autonomous surfacing is the primary loss-prevention mechanism. The 120-second threshold ensures the vehicle begins ascent before cascading faults can disable the emergency systems. This is the single most critical safety requirement for any untethered deep-sea vehicle.
Test stakeholder, safety, session-315
STK-OPS-003 The Autonomous Underwater Vehicle SHALL collect and store georeferenced multibeam bathymetry, optical imagery, and oceanographic data at resolutions sufficient for peer-reviewed scientific publication.
Rationale: Primary end users are marine scientists and hydrographic surveyors who require IHO S-44 Order 1 compliant bathymetry and georeferenced imagery for habitat mapping, infrastructure inspection, and geological survey. Data that cannot meet publication standards has no value — the entire mission cost is wasted.
Inspection stakeholder, session-315
STK-OPS-004 The Autonomous Underwater Vehicle SHALL be deployable and recoverable from a standard oceanographic research vessel using a single A-frame crane without requiring hull modifications to the vessel.
Rationale: AUVs operate from vessels of opportunity — research vessels, offshore supply vessels, and naval auxiliaries. Requiring specialised launch equipment limits operational availability and increases mobilisation costs. A-frame deployment with standard rigging is the industry baseline for vehicles under 500kg.
Demonstration stakeholder, session-315
STK-OPS-005 The Autonomous Underwater Vehicle SHALL operate without emitting acoustic energy exceeding 180 dB re 1µPa at 1m in frequency bands below 1kHz during survey operations to minimise disturbance to marine mammals.
Rationale: Operations in marine protected areas and environmentally sensitive sites require compliance with NOAA/NMFS acoustic exposure guidelines. Thruster noise and low-frequency sonar emissions are the primary contributors. Exceeding 180 dB SPL triggers marine mammal harassment thresholds under the US Marine Mammal Protection Act and equivalent EU regulations.
Test stakeholder, environmental, session-315
STK-OPS-007 The Autonomous Underwater Vehicle SHALL be designed and documented in accordance with DNV-ST-0512 or equivalent marine classification society rules for autonomous and remotely operated submersible vehicles, including structural, electrical, and safety system requirements.
Rationale: Marine classification society approval is required for operation in international waters and by most research institutions. DNV-ST-0512 is the primary standard for autonomous underwater vehicles. Without classification, the vehicle cannot be insured or deployed from most research vessels.
Inspection stakeholder, regulatory, validation, session-321
STK-OPS-008 The Autonomous Underwater Vehicle SHALL support field-level maintenance including battery replacement, sensor module exchange, and hull seal inspection by a two-person technical team using standard hand tools within 4 hours, without requiring drydock facilities.
Rationale: Research vessels operate on tight schedules with limited technical staff. AUV turnaround between missions must be achievable with the ship science party. Requiring specialist facilities or large teams for routine maintenance would severely limit operational availability during expedition cruises.
Demonstration stakeholder, maintainability, validation, session-321
STK-OPS-009 The Autonomous Underwater Vehicle SHALL operate in seawater temperatures from minus 2 degrees Celsius to 35 degrees Celsius, survive deck storage temperatures from minus 20 degrees Celsius to 55 degrees Celsius, and withstand deployment in sea states up to Sea State 4 from a vessel A-frame.
Rationale: The vehicle must operate in polar through tropical waters covering the full oceanographic temperature range. Deck storage on open vessels in Arctic or equatorial ports exposes the vehicle to extreme air temperatures. Sea State 4 is the practical limit for crane operations from typical research vessels and defines the minimum weather window for deployment and recovery.
Test stakeholder, environmental, validation, session-321

System Requirements (SYS)

RefRequirementV&VTags
SYS-FUNC-001 The AUV power subsystem SHALL provide a minimum usable energy capacity of 10kWh to support 24-hour missions at 3-knot cruise speed with all survey sensors active.
Rationale: Power budget analysis: propulsion at 3 knots draws 400W, navigation sensors 80W, survey payload 150W, vehicle management 50W, comms 20W = 700W total. 24h × 700W = 16.8kWh gross, but with 15% abort reserve and 85% battery depth-of-discharge limit, the required installed capacity is approximately 10kWh usable from a 13kWh pack.
Test system, performance, session-315
SYS-FUNC-002 The AUV navigation subsystem SHALL maintain position accuracy of less than 0.1% of distance travelled over a 24-hour mission without GPS or surface position fixes.
Rationale: Survey data georeferencing requires knowing vehicle position to within the resolution of the multibeam sonar footprint. At 100m altitude, the multibeam footprint is approximately 1m. Over a 24h mission at 3 knots the vehicle travels ~130km, so 0.1% DTT gives 130m drift — acceptable with periodic DVL bottom-lock and INS aiding, and within post-processing correction capability using terrain-relative navigation.
Test system, performance, session-315
SYS-FUNC-003 When a critical fault is detected, the emergency and safety subsystem SHALL initiate drop-weight release and positive-buoyancy ascent within 5 seconds of fault confirmation, independent of the vehicle management computer.
Rationale: The 120-second surface-and-activate-beacon requirement from STK-OPS-002 includes ascent time plus beacon activation. From 6000m, passive buoyant ascent at approximately 1m/s takes 100 minutes — far exceeding 120s. The 5-second initiation requirement ensures no delay is added by the safety system itself. Independence from the VMC is essential because the VMC may be the failed component.
Test system, safety, session-315
SYS-FUNC-004 The emergency and safety subsystem SHALL include a hardware watchdog timer that triggers emergency surfacing if the vehicle management computer heartbeat is absent for more than 60 seconds.
Rationale: Software watchdogs can be defeated by the same fault that disables the VMC. A hardware watchdog on an independent microcontroller with its own power supply ensures that total VMC failure (hardware crash, power rail loss, software hang) always results in surfacing. The 60-second timeout allows for VMC reboot attempts while preventing extended uncontrolled descent.
Test system, safety, session-315
SYS-FUNC-005 The sensor payload subsystem SHALL acquire multibeam bathymetry data at a minimum resolution of 0.5m across a 120-degree swath at 100m altitude, compliant with IHO S-44 Order 1 standards.
Rationale: IHO S-44 Order 1 requires total horizontal uncertainty of 5m + 5% depth and vertical uncertainty of 0.5m at 95% confidence. At 100m altitude, a 400kHz multibeam with 120-degree swath covers approximately 200m width with 0.5m beam spacing. This resolution, combined with the 0.1% DTT navigation accuracy, satisfies the horizontal uncertainty budget for depths to 6000m.
Test system, performance, session-315
SYS-FUNC-006 The sensor payload subsystem SHALL provide a minimum of 4TB non-volatile storage with sustained write throughput of 200MB/s to support simultaneous multibeam, side-scan, camera, and CTD data logging for 72-hour missions.
Rationale: Data rate budget: multibeam at 50MB/s, side-scan at 30MB/s, 4K video at 100MB/s, CTD at 0.1MB/s = 180MB/s aggregate. 72h at 180MB/s = 46TB theoretical maximum, but with compression (4:1 typical for sonar) and duty-cycled camera operation, 4TB provides adequate capacity. 200MB/s write speed includes 10% margin over aggregate sensor rate.
Test system, performance, session-315
SYS-FUNC-007 The pressure hull and structure SHALL constrain total vehicle dry mass to no more than 350kg and maximum dimension to 4.5m length to permit single-point crane lift from a standard oceanographic A-frame.
Rationale: Standard oceanographic A-frames (e.g., on R/V class vessels) have a safe working load of 2-5 tonnes and a throat clearance of 3-5m. 350kg is well within the SWL including dynamic loading from sea state 4 conditions. The 4.5m length constraint ensures the vehicle fits within the A-frame width and can be handled on a working deck with standard rigging points.
Inspection system, physical, session-315
SYS-FUNC-008 When surfaced, the communications subsystem SHALL transmit GPS-derived position via Iridium SBD at intervals no greater than 5 minutes and activate a xenon strobe visible at 2 nautical miles in darkness.
Rationale: Post-mission or emergency surface recovery requires the support vessel to locate the AUV. Iridium SBD provides global coverage position reporting independent of vessel range. 5-minute interval balances power consumption against drift rate (surface currents typically 0.5-1 knot = 150-300m between reports). Xenon strobe at 2nm visibility is the COLREG standard for small vessel lights and enables visual acquisition in final approach.
Test system, recovery, session-315
SYS-FUNC-009 While conducting survey operations, the AUV SHALL not produce radiated noise exceeding 130 dB re 1µPa at 1m in the 10Hz-1kHz band from propulsion, and the multibeam sonar SHALL operate above 100kHz.
Rationale: Marine mammal hearing sensitivity peaks between 10Hz-1kHz for baleen whales. Propulsion noise at 130 dB SPL at source attenuates to below harassment threshold (120 dB RMS for continuous noise per NOAA guidelines) within 3m. Multibeam operation above 100kHz is outside the hearing range of most cetaceans (upper limit ~80kHz for most species). Combined, these constraints enable operations in marine protected areas without triggering permitting requirements.
Test system, environmental, session-315
SYS-FUNC-010 The pressure hull and structure SHALL withstand continuous external hydrostatic pressure of 600 bar (equivalent to 6000m seawater depth) with a minimum safety factor of 1.5 on yield strength.
Rationale: 6000m depth rating covers 97% of the ocean floor, enabling full-ocean-depth survey capability excluding only the hadal trenches. The 1.5 safety factor on yield for Ti-6Al-4V is consistent with DNV-GL rules for submersible pressure vessels and provides margin for material variability, cyclic fatigue from repeated dive profiles, and manufacturing tolerances on wall thickness.
Analysis system, structural, session-315
SYS-FUNC-011 The AUV SHALL achieve a mean time between critical failures of at least 2000 operating hours, where a critical failure is defined as any failure requiring mission abort or emergency surfacing.
Rationale: A 24-hour mission cycle with deployment costs exceeding 50000 USD per ship-day demands high reliability. 2000 hours MTBCF provides less than 1.2 percent probability of critical failure per mission, consistent with mature AUV platforms such as Kongsberg HUGIN and MBARI LRAUV. This value drives component selection, redundancy architecture, and screening requirements.
Analysis system, reliability, validation, session-321
SYS-FUNC-012 The AUV SHALL execute a comprehensive pre-dive built-in test sequence verifying all safety-critical subsystems including emergency surfacing controller, leak detection, battery management, navigation sensors, and communications, and SHALL report pass/fail status to the operator within 120 seconds of test initiation.
Rationale: Pre-dive checks are mandatory in all operational AUV programmes to prevent deploying a vehicle with latent faults. The 120-second budget reflects the practical constraint of launch windows from research vessels where deck time is limited. Every safety-critical subsystem must be exercised because a latent fault in the emergency system could lead to vehicle loss.
Test system, bite, safety, validation, session-321
SYS-FUNC-013 All wetted materials and external surfaces of the AUV SHALL resist corrosion and galvanic degradation in seawater for a minimum service life of 10 years with scheduled maintenance, using compatible materials per MIL-STD-889 or equivalent galvanic compatibility standard.
Rationale: Seawater is a highly aggressive electrolyte. Dissimilar metal junctions, particularly titanium hull to aluminium fittings or stainless steel fasteners, create galvanic cells that cause rapid corrosion. MIL-STD-889 provides the accepted galvanic compatibility guidance. A 10-year service life reflects typical AUV fleet investment horizons and drives material selection for hull, fasteners, connectors, and fairings.
Analysis system, materials, corrosion, validation, session-321
SYS-FUNC-014 The AUV internal electronics SHALL not produce electromagnetic interference that degrades the performance of any onboard sensor below its specified accuracy, and all subsystems SHALL be immune to conducted and radiated emissions from the propulsion motor drive at switching frequencies up to 40 kHz.
Rationale: The AUV houses sensitive acoustic receivers, magnetometers within the INS, and precision analogue front-ends for CTD in close proximity to a 250W BLDC motor drive switching at 20 kHz. Without EMC discipline, motor harmonics couple into sensor cables and degrade measurement quality. Internal EMC is the primary concern rather than external regulatory compliance since the vehicle operates far from other electronic systems.
Test system, emc, validation, session-321

Requirements by Category (IEEE 29148)

4
Functional Requirements
7
Performance Requirements
1
Interface Requirements
4
Safety Requirements
2
Environmental Requirements
1
Compliance & Regulatory
2
Other

Traceability Matrix — STK to SYS

SourceTargetTypeDescription
STK-OPS-002 SYS-FUNC-012 derives Safe surfacing need drives pre-dive verification of safety systems
STK-OPS-009 SYS-FUNC-011 derives Wide environmental envelope drives reliability targets
STK-OPS-008 SYS-FUNC-007 derives Maintainability drives modular construction within handling constraints
STK-OPS-007 SYS-FUNC-003 derives Classification rules mandate independent emergency recovery capability
STK-OPS-007 SYS-FUNC-010 derives Classification rules drive structural safety factor requirements
STK-OPS-002 SYS-FUNC-008 derives Emergency surfacing requires recovery aids for vehicle location
STK-OPS-005 SYS-FUNC-009 derives Marine mammal protection requires propulsion noise and sonar frequency constraints
STK-OPS-004 SYS-FUNC-008 derives Recovery from vessel requires location aids when surfaced
STK-OPS-004 SYS-FUNC-007 derives Standard vessel deployment constrains vehicle mass and dimensions
STK-OPS-003 SYS-FUNC-006 derives Georeferenced data collection requires adequate onboard storage capacity
STK-OPS-003 SYS-FUNC-005 derives Publication-quality bathymetry requires specified multibeam resolution and swath
STK-OPS-002 SYS-FUNC-004 derives Autonomous fault detection requires hardware watchdog as last-resort trigger
STK-OPS-002 SYS-FUNC-003 derives Vehicle loss prevention requires independent emergency buoyancy
STK-OPS-001 SYS-FUNC-002 derives Autonomous survey requires dead-reckoning navigation accuracy
STK-OPS-001 SYS-FUNC-001 derives 24-hour autonomous mission requires sufficient energy storage