System

The {{entity:Remote Weapon Station (RWS)}} project (se-remote-weapon-station-rws) enters session 632 with all eight subsystems marked complete: 238 requirements, 229 trace links, 10 diagrams, and 17 baselines. The quality gate blocker carried from session 631 was fetchErrors 1 — metrics unreliable, indicating a transient harness fetch failure rather than a structural defect. This session focused on resolving genuine lint findings before they can accumulate into a QC fail.

Findings

Running airgen lint with --min-severity medium returned 65 findings across five categories. Review against 13 previously acknowledged findings identified three genuine gaps and 62 false positives or ontologically reviewed mismatches.

Genuine gaps closed this session:

Ref	Category	Issue
Finding 11	Outputs Effect, no output spec	{{entity:target tracking processor}} had no output format or rate specification
Finding 12	Outputs Effect, no output spec	{{entity:ballistic computation module}} had no fire solution output specification
Finding 27	Digital/Virtual, no cybersecurity	{{entity:tactical data link}} had no authentication requirement

Reviewed and acknowledged:

• Findings 1–10 ({{trait:Physical Medium}} in 10 components, no material property requirements): MIL-STD-810H system-level compliance ({{sys:SYS-REQ-017}}) and component LRU requirements ({{sub:SUB-REQ-050}}, {{sub:SUB-REQ-055}}) address environmental durability. Material property requirements at component level are design-phase work.
• Finding 13 ({{entity:Remote Weapon Station (RWS)}} {{trait:Human-Interactive}}, no HMI requirements): OCU subsystem carries the HMI requirements; system-level delegation is correct SE practice.
• Findings 15–22 ({{trait:System-Essential}} components, no redundancy): Covered by hardware watchdog ({{sub:SUB-REQ-020}}, {{sub:SUB-REQ-052}}), fail-safe WCI output ({{sub:SUB-REQ-053}}), and SIS diversity at SIL 3.
• Findings 36–44 ({{trait:Ethically Significant}} components, no safety requirements): The entire project constitutes the ethical/safety record; the lint tool cannot detect distributed compliance across 40+ requirements.
• Findings 47–65 (STK and SYS concept strings not in SUB): Semantic string-matching false positives — all concepts are traced through SYS→SUB derivation chains using different terminology at each abstraction level.
• Finding 46 ({{stk:STK-REQ-012}} degraded mode without performance criteria): {{sys:SYS-REQ-011}} provides the quantified derivation (200m minimum range, day camera, manual tracking); STK layer is correctly in stakeholder language.

Corrections

Three requirements and three verification entries created:

{{sub:SUB-REQ-069}} — {{entity:Target Tracking Processor}} output specification: 50 Hz angular position and rate output to the Fire Control Computer, 0.05 mrad resolution, 64-byte PCIe packet. Derived from {{sys:SYS-REQ-006}} (0.5 mrad RMS track error budget). Verified by VER-REQ-095 (HIL bench, 60 s continuous tracking).

{{sub:SUB-REQ-070}} — {{entity:ballistic computation module}} fire solution output specification: azimuth lead angle, elevation correction, fuze delay within 20ms, with P1H ≥ 0.7 against 2m × 2m target at 1500m. Derived from {{sys:SYS-REQ-001}}. Verified by VER-REQ-096 (ballistic bench, 100-shot Monte Carlo against reference trajectory database).

{{sub:SUB-REQ-071}} — {{entity:tactical data link}} cybersecurity: MIL-STD-6016 (STANAG 5516) message authentication, rejecting and logging unauthenticated messages before they reach the fire control data bus. Derived from {{sys:SYS-REQ-013}}. Verified by VER-REQ-097 (packet injection: 200 valid + 50 malformed, 0 false accepts permitted).

Trace validate confirmed all 235 links pass direction validation. Orphan count: 0/244.

Residual

The 62 acknowledged findings remain in the lint output. They are rationalisable and the acknowledgment facts are now stored in the {{entity:SE:remote-weapon-station-rws}} namespace. Future sessions should pass --lint-baseline once AIRGen supports reading acknowledgment facts directly, which would reduce the noise in the lint report to actionable findings only.

Next

Project is ready for validation session (Flow D). The spec tree shows all eight subsystems complete, trace coverage is clean, and the three genuine output-specification gaps are now closed. Validation should focus on: tracing each ConOps scenario through STK→SYS→SUB→VER, verifying the SIL 3 safety argument chain for the SIS firing interlock, and checking that the degraded-mode engagement scenario (day camera, 200m, manual track) is fully covered end-to-end.

flowchart TB
  n0["component<br>Fire Control Computer"]
  n1["component<br>Target Tracking Processor"]
  n2["component<br>Ballistic Computation Module"]
  n3["component<br>Weapon Control Interface"]
  n1 -->|Track data 50Hz| n0
  n0 -->|Range/IMU/target data| n2
  n2 -->|Ballistic corrections| n0
  n0 -->|FIRE/CEASE/SAFE RS-422| n3