Emergency Diesel Generator for UK Nuclear Site — Concept Definition

System

The {{entity:Emergency Diesel Generator for a UK Nuclear Licensed Site}} ({{hex:DFF73A59}}) is a Class 1 safety system providing standby electrical power during loss-of-offsite-power events at UK nuclear licensed sites. Its mission: ensure continuous cooling of reactor fuel to prevent core damage when the National Grid is unavailable. Compliance with Office for Nuclear Regulation Safety Assessment Principles, IEC 61513 (Instrumentation and Control for Nuclear Power Plants), and IEC 62645 (Nuclear Power Plants — Instrumentation, Control and Electrical Power Systems — Cybersecurity Requirements) is mandatory. The system must achieve 0.975 start-on-demand reliability and reach rated voltage within 10 seconds of LOOP detection.

ConOps

Seven operating modes span the EDG lifecycle:

ModeEntryExit
{{trait:Standby}} ReadyPost-maintenance/testLOOP signal → Emergency Start
Emergency StartLOOP detectionRated V/Hz in 10s → Running Loaded
Running LoadedLoad sequencing completeGrid stable → Cooldown
Cooldown ShutdownOffsite power restoredEngine stopped → Standby Ready
Surveillance TestScheduled monthly testTest complete → Cooldown
Maintenance Out-of-ServiceLOTO appliedPMT passed → Standby Ready
Degraded OperationFault detected while runningFault cleared or operator decision

Six ConOps scenarios define operational reality: (1) LOOP response at 02:30 with both trains starting and operator monitoring from control room; (2) failure-to-start with stuck fuel solenoid requiring maintenance intervention; (3) EDG trip during extended LOOP due to cooling fan belt failure; (4) monthly surveillance test demonstrating 9.8-second start; (5) station blackout with common-cause loss of both EDGs requiring mobile generator; (6) planned 14-day overhaul during refuelling outage.

Hazard Register

IDHazardSeveritySILSafe State
H-001Failure to start on demandCatastrophic3Diverse backup power or reactor trip
H-002Loss of output during operationCatastrophic3Auto-transfer to alternate EDG
H-003Engine overspeedCritical2Mechanical trip and fuel cutoff
H-004Fire in EDG buildingCritical2Fire suppression, alternate EDG
H-005Fuel contamination/exhaustionCritical2Alternate tank, replenishment
H-006Cooling system failureCritical2High-temp trip, alternate EDG
H-007Common cause failure (both EDGs)Catastrophic4Diverse AC, DC batteries, passive cooling
H-008Seismic damageCritical2Post-seismic inspection
H-009Spurious start/tripMajor1Operator verification
H-010Cyber attackCatastrophic3Air-gapped backup, hardwired trips

Cross-domain analogs: elevator overspeed governors (mechanical trip pattern for H-003), offshore platform fire protection systems (deluge/foam for H-004), fusion plant cooling loss scenarios (thermal management for H-006).

Stakeholders

RoleRelationshipHexScenarios
Control Room OperatorPrimary operational interface{{hex:00AD6AF9}}1-5
Shift SupervisorLCO and emergency decisions{{hex:01857AF9}}2-3, 5-6
Mechanical TechnicianEngine maintenance/repair{{hex:018C28F8}}2-3, 6
I&C TechnicianControl/protection systems{{hex:00A530F8}}2, 4, 6
ONRRegulatory approval{{hex:008578FD}}All
LicenseeUltimate safety responsibility{{hex:008538FD}}All
EDG OEMTechnical support, spares{{hex:40805098}}6
Local CommunityExpects accident prevention{{hex:000412BD}}

Operating Environment

  • Seismic: Category I, 0.2g PGA design basis per EUR requirements
  • Environmental: -10°C to +40°C ambient, IP54 minimum, coastal atmosphere
  • EMC: IEC 61000-4 immunity, no spurious actuation from EMI
  • Reliability: 0.975 start probability, 0.999 24-hour mission reliability
  • Fuel: 7-day inventory at 100% load, EN 590 quality, diverse supply
  • Time: 10-second start-to-rated-voltage, 15-second full load acceptance

External Interfaces

flowchart TB
  EDG["Emergency Diesel Generator"]
  GRID["National Grid"]
  BUS["Emergency AC Bus"]
  PPS["Plant Protection System"]
  MCR["Main Control Room"]
  UHS["Ultimate Heat Sink"]
  FUEL["Fuel Supply"]
  DC["DC Battery System"]
  GRID -->|LOOP signal| EDG
  EDG -->|6.6kV AC power| BUS
  PPS -->|Start/stop commands| EDG
  EDG -->|Status signals| PPS
  EDG -->|HMI data| MCR
  MCR -->|Manual controls| EDG
  UHS -->|Cooling water| EDG
  FUEL -->|Diesel fuel| EDG
  DC -->|Control/start power| EDG

Next

The scaffold session should derive STK requirements from the ConOps scenarios, focusing on the {{entity:Control Room Operator}}‘s needs for monitoring and manual intervention, the {{entity:Shift Supervisor}}‘s decision support during LCO entry, and the {{entity:ONR}}‘s demonstration requirements for reliability and safety function adequacy. The station blackout scenario (H-007) demands particular attention — the safe state requires diverse alternate AC sources and battery coping time that may exceed current assumptions.

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