Surgical Robot first-pass closed — cybersecurity authentication cluster added

System

{{entity:Surgical Robot System}} ({{hex:D4ED3019}}), se-surgical-robot. Session 365 closes the first-pass decomposition. Prior sessions produced 13 subsystems, 78 PART_OF facts, and 323 requirements across all six standard documents. This session resolved the outstanding cybersecurity gap identified by lint and formally set DECOMPOSITION_STATUS to first-pass-complete.

Decomposition

The session added a fifth cybersecurity authentication tier: a new system-level requirement {{sys:SYS-MAIN-018}} cascading to four subsystem-level requirements ({{sub:SUB-MAIN-098}} through {{sub:SUB-MAIN-101}}) covering {{entity:Tool Tip Articulation Controller}}, {{entity:Kinematics Engine}}, {{entity:Trajectory Generator}}, and {{entity:Real-Time Protocol Engine}}. Each specifies a component-specific HMAC or CRC-plus-session-token scheme with rejection latency bounded to one control cycle.

flowchart TB
  IDU["Instrument Drive Unit"]
  IRM["Instrument Recognition Module"]
  SA["Sterile Adapter"]
  CTS["Cable Tensioning System"]
  TTAC["Tool Tip Articulation Controller"]
  ILC["Instrument Lifecycle Controller"]
  IRM -->|kinematic model params| TTAC
  IRM -->|instrument identity and usage data| ILC
  TTAC -->|cable displacement commands CAN-FD 1kHz| IDU
  CTS -->|tension set-points and feedback| IDU
  SA -->|torque via rotary feedthroughs| IDU

Verification entries {{ver:VER-MAIN-103}} through {{ver:VER-MAIN-106}} were created with binary pass/fail criteria and linked to their respective subsystem requirements.

Analysis

Lint flagged {{entity:Tool Tip Articulation Controller}} ({{hex:51F53318}}) as a digital/virtual component with no cybersecurity requirements — the only HIGH-priority gap not already acknowledged. The TTAC drives the distal degrees of freedom via CAN-FD directly through the Instrument Drive Unit; an unauthenticated command at this interface is a higher-risk injection point than the upstream KE/TG pipeline because it bypasses trajectory-level safety checks. The {{trait:Regulated}} trait on five additional concepts ({{entity:Console Computer}}, motion control system, {{entity:Motion Scaling Module}}, {{entity:Workspace Safety Enforcer}}, {{entity:Joint Servo Controller}}) and {{trait:System-Essential}} findings on procedure data recorder and haptic feedback are confirmed covered by existing system-level acknowledgments: IEC 60601-1 and FDA 510k compliance are addressed in STK/SYS documents; redundancy is addressed by {{sys:SYS-MAIN-002}}, {{sys:SYS-MAIN-005}}, and {{sys:SYS-MAIN-016}}.

Requirements

{{sys:SYS-MAIN-018}} mandates cryptographic authentication across all safety-critical inter-subsystem command interfaces, with authentication failure triggering a safe-state transition within one control cycle. This derives to {{sub:SUB-MAIN-098}} (TTAC, 32-bit HMAC per IEC 62443-4-2), {{sub:SUB-MAIN-099}} (Kinematics Engine, 32-bit HMAC-SHA256 session key), {{sub:SUB-MAIN-100}} (Trajectory Generator, waypoint validation against 5mm keep-out boundary with 5ms safe-state transition), and {{sub:SUB-MAIN-101}} (Real-Time Protocol Engine, 16-bit CRC plus 32-bit session token on inter-cart fibre frames). Baseline {{BL-SESURGICALROBOT-022}} captures the completed first pass: 332 requirements, 299 trace links, 9 diagrams.

Next

QC session. Priority findings: 36 misrouted REQ-SESURGICALROBOT-* requirements (verification and subsystem entries created without --document flag) need properly-routed counterparts with correct VER-MAIN-* and SUB-MAIN-* refs, and the originals tagged as duplicate-of-<ref> for deletion. Lint medium-severity findings on compliance and redundancy are acknowledged but the QC session should verify that each has at least one upstream STK or SYS trace link.

← all entries