Surgical Robot System — Safety and Interlock Subsystem Decomposed, First SIL 3 Architecture Established
System
The {{entity:Surgical Robot System}} (hex {{hex:D4ED3019}}) is a new project at scaffold stage. This session covers the complete first-pass setup: stakeholder requirements, system requirements, linksets, and full decomposition of the {{entity:Safety and Interlock Subsystem}} — the highest-risk subsystem by safety integrity level. Seven additional subsystems are classified and structurally registered; their internal decomposition remains for subsequent sessions.
Decomposition
Five stakeholder requirements ({{stk:STK-MAIN-001}} through {{stk:STK-MAIN-005}}) cover surgical precision, patient safety, OR integration, sterility, and ergonomics. Six system requirements ({{sys:SYS-MAIN-001}} through {{sys:SYS-MAIN-006}}) allocate quantified performance budgets: ±0.1mm tip repeatability at <1ms loop latency, 250ms fault-to-safe-state, 1080p/60Hz at <100ms video latency, ≤0.1N force sensing, 60s UPS bridge, and ISO 11135 sterility compliance. All STK→SYS trace links are derived from hazard analysis and regulatory mandates, not functional proximity.
The {{entity:Safety and Interlock Subsystem}} ({{hex:50B53A18}}) was selected for priority decomposition because it has the highest safety integrity (SIL 3 target), the most interfaces with other subsystems, and sets the architectural constraints that all other subsystems must satisfy. Five components were identified and classified:
- {{entity:Watchdog Timer Controller}} ({{hex:D6B53A08}}) — dedicated hardware safety processor, independent of motion control
- {{entity:Emergency Stop Chain}} ({{hex:44AD7810}}) — hardwired 24V DC series loop through all E-stop actuators
- {{entity:Joint Force Monitor}} ({{hex:55F77B18}}) — 1kHz per-axis torque threshold with graduated brake response
- {{entity:Communication Monitor}} ({{hex:55B77A18}}) — sideband link quality monitor, latency and loss at 1kHz
- {{entity:Safe State Manager}} ({{hex:40B57A10}}) — state machine coordinating OPERATIONAL / DEGRADED / SAFE-HOLD transitions
flowchart TB
WTC["Watchdog Timer Controller"]
ESC["Emergency Stop Chain"]
JFM["Joint Force Monitor"]
CM["Communication Monitor"]
SSM["Safe State Manager"]
WTC -->|watchdog trip| SSM
ESC -->|E-stop event| SSM
JFM -->|force violation| SSM
CM -->|link fault| SSM
Analysis
The strongest cross-domain insight came from comparing the {{entity:Safe State Manager}} against the knowledge graph. The {{entity:Reactor Trip Subsystem}} from the nuclear reactor protection project shares 30 of 32 traits (Jaccard 0.9375) — the highest similarity found. The nuclear RPS design principle of automatic trip initiation without operator confirmation maps directly to surgical safety: if safe-state entry required surgeon confirmation, the ~500ms human reaction time would blow the 250ms fault response budget established in {{sys:SYS-MAIN-002}}. This produced {{sub:SUB-MAIN-012}} (automatic initiation, deliberate recovery), which was not in the original requirement set. The {{entity:Emergency Stop Chain}} ({{hex:44AD7810}}) shows lower cross-domain similarity, consistent with its domain-specific hardwired series-loop architecture being uncommon outside industrial machinery — confirming its classification is correctly specific.
The lint run identified 1 low-severity finding. The orphan report shows 15 orphaned requirements, of which 13 are from a partial prior session and 2 ({{sub:SUB-MAIN-004}}, {{sub:SUB-MAIN-005}}) were created this session and have now been linked. Architecture decisions ({{stk:ARC-MAIN-001}}, ARC-MAIN-002) are expectedly orphaned — they are not trace-linked by design.
Requirements
Six subsystem requirements ({{sub:SUB-MAIN-001}} through {{sub:SUB-MAIN-005}}, {{sub:SUB-MAIN-012}}) cover the SIS: graduated force limits (50ms at 110%, 20ms at 150%), communication loss freeze (10ms at 3-frame threshold), 250ms end-to-end safe state, watchdog physical isolation, hardwired E-stop, and automatic state transition. Four interface requirements ({{ifc:IFC-MAIN-001}} through {{ifc:IFC-MAIN-004}}) specify: joint torque real-time bus (1kHz, <200µs, hardware CRC), E-stop contactor loop (50ms drop-out by capacitor discharge), communication sideband status register (1kHz, no in-band interference), and safe-state broadcast (5ms, guaranteed delivery). Five verification entries ({{stk:VER-MAIN-001}} through VER-MAIN-005) cover each interface with fault injection tests and a system-level 250ms safe-state end-to-end integration test. Baseline DECOMP-2026-03-19 captured.
Next
Seven subsystems remain undecomposed at component level: Surgeon Input Console, Patient-Side Cart, Instrument Drive Unit, Vision and Imaging Subsystem, Motion Control and Scaling Subsystem, Haptic Feedback Subsystem, and Power Management Subsystem. Priority order: Motion Control (most interfaces with SIS, most cross-domain complexity), then Haptic Feedback (closes the force sensing loop in {{sys:SYS-MAIN-004}}), then Patient-Side Cart (structural dependencies on IDU and MCS). Prior-session orphaned requirements (13 unlinked) should be reviewed for STK→SYS linkage in the next session before marking first-pass-complete.