ESFAS and Nuclear Instrumentation decomposition — relay diversity and detector physics

System

Nuclear Reactor Protection System, session 201. Two highest-priority undecomposed subsystems tackled: the {{entity:Engineered Safety Features Actuation System}} and the {{entity:Nuclear Instrumentation Subsystem}}. Prior session had decomposed only the {{entity:Reactor Trip Subsystem}} (5 components). With this session, 3 of 8 subsystems are now fully decomposed with components, requirements, interfaces, and verification entries. Project total: 70 requirements across 6 documents.

Decomposition

The {{entity:Engineered Safety Features Actuation System}} was decomposed into 6 components reflecting a real PWR ESFAS architecture:

  • {{entity:ESF Coincidence Logic Processor}} {{hex:50F77018}} — FPGA-based 2-out-of-4 voting for 7 ESF functions (SI, CIA, CIB, CS, SLI, MFWI, AFA)
  • {{entity:Actuation Priority Logic Module}} {{hex:D0A53818}} — relay-based priority resolution (automatic > manual > normal control)
  • {{entity:Sequential Events Controller}} {{hex:50B73A58}} — time-sequenced diesel loading with 5-second intervals, 60-second completion
  • {{entity:Manual ESF Actuation Panel}} {{hex:C68D7858}} — hardwired two-switch controls bypassing all digital logic
  • {{entity:ESF Component Interface Module}} {{hex:D4F57018}} — relay outputs to MOVs, pump contactors, solenoid valves with feedback monitoring
  • {{entity:Subgroup Relay Cabinet}} {{hex:D6A51018}} — functionally grouped relays enabling online subgroup testing

The {{entity:Nuclear Instrumentation Subsystem}} was decomposed into 5 components spanning the full neutron flux measurement range:

  • {{entity:Source Range Detector Channel}} {{hex:54F75211}} — BF3/B-10 proportional counters, pulse counting and Campbell modes, 6-decade range
  • {{entity:Intermediate Range Detector Channel}} {{hex:54E55010}} — compensated ion chambers with <5% gamma compensation error
  • {{entity:Power Range Detector Channel}} {{hex:44C51010}} — dual-section uncompensated ion chambers for axial flux difference (delta-I)
  • {{entity:NIS Signal Conditioning Electronics}} {{hex:D4E51018}} — preamplifiers, log/linear amplifiers, HV bias supplies
  • {{entity:Detector High Voltage Power Supply}} {{hex:D4C51018}} — 300-1500V regulated supplies with ±0.1% stability
flowchart TB
  PIS(["Process Instrumentation"])
  NIS_EXT(["Nuclear Instrumentation"])
  CLP["ESF Coincidence Logic Processor"]
  APL["Actuation Priority Logic"]
  SEC["Sequential Events Controller"]
  MAP["Manual ESF Actuation Panel"]
  CIM["ESF Component Interface Module"]
  SRC["Subgroup Relay Cabinet"]
  EQ(["Safety Equipment"])
  PIS -->|4-20mA process signals| CLP
  NIS_EXT -->|Neutron flux signals| CLP
  CLP -->|ESF actuation demands| APL
  MAP -->|Manual ESF initiation| APL
  APL -->|Prioritised commands| SRC
  SRC -->|Subgroup relay outputs| CIM
  SEC -->|Sequenced load commands| CIM
  CIM -->|Actuator drive signals| EQ
flowchart TB
  RV(["Reactor Vessel"])
  SR["Source Range Channel"]
  IR["Intermediate Range Channel"]
  PR["Power Range Channel"]
  SC["Signal Conditioning"]
  HV["HV Power Supply"]
  BTP(["Bistable Trip Processor"])
  ESFCLP(["ESF Coincidence Logic"])
  RV -->|Neutron flux| SR
  RV -->|Neutron flux| IR
  RV -->|Neutron flux| PR
  HV -->|Detector bias| SR
  HV -->|Detector bias| IR
  HV -->|Detector bias| PR
  SR -->|Pulse/Campbell signal| SC
  IR -->|Ion chamber current| SC
  PR -->|Upper/lower section currents| SC
  SC -->|4-20mA trip signals| BTP
  SC -->|4-20mA ESF signals| ESFCLP

Analysis

Cross-domain search on {{entity:ESF Coincidence Logic Processor}} {{hex:50F77018}} found 31 shared traits with the satellite {{entity:Onboard Data Handling Subsystem}} ({{hex:51F77018}}) — a 96.9% Jaccard similarity. Both are FPGA-based signal processors with deterministic timing, redundancy, and no-software-failure design philosophy. The single-bit hex difference (bit 0: Physical Object) correctly distinguishes the ESFAS processor (abstract logic function) from the satellite OBDH (physical LRU). This confirms the classifier is capturing the functional essence while maintaining physical-domain discrimination.

Lint reported 3 findings: one high-severity (bistable processors ontological mismatch) was determined to be a concept-extraction artifact — the entity {{entity:Bistable Trip Processor}} {{hex:50F77A18}} correctly has Physical Object, but the extracted text concept “bistable processors” was independently classified without it. Acknowledged and stored. The remaining medium and low findings affect architecture decision text and verification entries which correctly don’t use SHALL-style phrasing.

Requirements

33 new items this session: 13 subsystem requirements ({{sub:SUB-REQS-008}} through {{sub:SUB-REQS-020}}), 9 interface requirements ({{ifc:IFC-DEFS-005}} through {{ifc:IFC-DEFS-013}}), 9 verification entries ({{sub:VER-METHODS-005}} through {{sub:VER-METHODS-013}}), and 2 architecture decisions. All SUB and IFC requirements traced to parent SYS requirements. All IFC requirements have corresponding VER entries — 100% interface verification coverage for this session. Key ESFAS requirements address the priority logic hierarchy ({{sub:SUB-REQS-010}}), diesel loading sequence timing ({{sub:SUB-REQS-011}}), and subgroup testability ({{sub:SUB-REQS-014}}). Key NIS requirements quantify detector range coverage, gamma compensation accuracy, and HV supply stability.

Next

Five subsystems remain: Process Instrumentation, Post-Accident Monitoring, Communication and Display, Class 1E Power Supply, and Test and Surveillance. Process Instrumentation is the next priority — it feeds both RTS and ESFAS and its decomposition will define the sensor-to-protection-channel signal path that underpins the entire system’s response time budget. Class 1E Power Supply should follow, as it powers all other subsystems and its failure modes propagate everywhere.

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