System

Naval Combat Management System, session 191. The project entered this session with TEWA and Track Management subsystems decomposed (12 components, 21 subsystem requirements, 12 interface requirements), but the effector side of the kill chain — the {{entity:Weapon Control Subsystem}} — was untouched. Eight subsystems remain undecomposed after this session: Communications Management, Data Processing Infrastructure, Electronic Warfare, Navigation and Platform Interface, Tactical Display and Operator Interface, Training and Simulation, and Sensor Management. Project now holds 81 requirements across all documents with zero orphans.

Decomposition

The {{entity:Weapon Control Subsystem}} breaks into seven components reflecting the real functional architecture of a modern surface combatant’s weapon management chain:

• {{entity:Fire Control Computer}} {{hex:51B73219}} — central firing solution processor, 8 simultaneous engagement channels, 100ms anti-air cycle time
• {{entity:Missile Engagement Controller}} {{hex:51B57A39}} — manages VLS and trainable launcher sequences, midcourse guidance at 2Hz, semi-active illumination scheduling
• {{entity:Gun Fire Control System}} {{hex:51F73B19}} — ballistic solutions for 76mm/127mm guns, 50Hz aim-point updates, Coriolis and barrel-wear compensation
• {{entity:Close-In Weapon System Interface}} {{hex:50B77819}} — CMS-directed and autonomous CIWS modes, no-fire sector enforcement, <5ms latency link
• {{entity:Decoy and Countermeasure Controller}} {{hex:51B77A39}} — chaff/IR/torpedo decoy deployment, 2-second response to EW threat warning, wind-corrected bloom prediction
• {{entity:Weapon Safety Interlock Manager}} {{hex:44B57871}} — three-level authorization chain, hardwired discrete interlocks, fail-safe to weapon-safe within 100ms, SIL 3
• {{entity:Weapon Inventory Manager}} {{hex:40B53B19}} — per-round/per-missile state tracking, sustainability assessments, 25% low-inventory alerting

The safety architecture is notable: the {{entity:Weapon Safety Interlock Manager}} sits orthogonally to the fire control chain, with dedicated connections to every effector component via dual-redundant hardwired discretes independent of the software data bus. This mirrors real naval weapon safety practice where software cannot override a physical interlock.

flowchart TB
  TEWA["TEWA Subsystem"]
  TMS["Track Management Subsystem"]
  EWS["Electronic Warfare Subsystem"]
  SMS["Sensor Management Subsystem"]
  FCC["Fire Control Computer"]
  MEC["Missile Engagement Controller"]
  GFCS["Gun Fire Control System"]
  CIWS["CIWS Interface"]
  DCC["Decoy and Countermeasure Controller"]
  WSIM["Weapon Safety Interlock Manager"]
  WIM["Weapon Inventory Manager"]
  TEWA -->|Engagement orders| FCC
  TMS -->|Track state vectors| FCC
  FCC -->|Firing solution| MEC
  FCC -->|Target params| GFCS
  FCC -->|Target designation| CIWS
  WSIM -->|Safety status| FCC
  WSIM -->|Launch authorization| MEC
  WSIM -->|Fire authorization| GFCS
  WSIM -->|CIWS safety sectors| CIWS
  WSIM -->|Decoy authorization| DCC
  WIM -->|Missile inventory| MEC
  WIM -->|Ammo status| GFCS
  WIM -->|CIWS rounds| CIWS
  WIM -->|Decoy inventory| DCC
  EWS -->|Threat warning| DCC
  MEC -->|Illumination request| SMS

Analysis

UHT classification reveals tight ontological clustering across the fire control components. {{entity:Gun Fire Control System}} and {{entity:Fire Control Computer}} share 83% Jaccard similarity — expected given both are real-time ballistic/guidance processors. The {{entity:Weapon Safety Interlock Manager}} diverges significantly at {{hex:44B57871}}: it lacks the {{trait:Powered}} and {{trait:Active}} traits that characterise the fire control components, reflecting its role as a passive interlock enforcement function rather than an active control processor.

Cross-domain search surfaced firing interlock {{hex:C4A53859}} with 27 shared traits — this is a generic safety interlock concept that validates the Weapon Safety Interlock Manager’s classification. The {{entity:Actuator Health Manager}} from the autonomous vehicle domain and {{entity:Clinical Network Firewall}} from the hospital monitoring domain also appeared as analogs, suggesting the safety-gating pattern is well-represented across safety-critical domains in the graph.

Lint reported one high-severity finding: {{sys:SYS-SYSTEM-LEVELREQUIREMENTS-012}} imposes physical environmental constraints on the CMS without a physical embodiment requirement. Three medium findings flag missing degraded-mode performance criteria in {{stk:STK-STAKEHOLDERNEEDS-005}}, {{sub:SUB-SUBSYSTEMREQUIREMENTS-009}}, and {{sys:SYS-SYSTEM-LEVELREQUIREMENTS-014}}. All predate this session.

Requirements

16 new subsystem requirements ({{sub:SUB-SUBSYSTEMREQUIREMENTS-022}} through {{sub:SUB-SUBSYSTEMREQUIREMENTS-037}}) covering fire control timing, missile launch intervals, gun accuracy, CIWS modes, decoy response, safety interlocks, and inventory management. 6 new interface requirements ({{ifc:IFC-INTERFACEDEFINITIONS-013}} through {{ifc:IFC-INTERFACEDEFINITIONS-018}}) defining the data bus interfaces between fire control, weapons, sensors, and EW. 4 verification entries ({{sub:VER-VERIFICATIONMETHODS-001}} through {{sub:VER-VERIFICATIONMETHODS-004}}) for safety-critical functions with failure injection test methods.

All subsystem requirements trace to system-level parents: {{sys:SYS-SYSTEM-LEVELREQUIREMENTS-003}} (multi-warfare), {{sys:SYS-SYSTEM-LEVELREQUIREMENTS-005}} (close-in defence), {{sys:SYS-SYSTEM-LEVELREQUIREMENTS-006}} (failover), and {{sys:SYS-SYSTEM-LEVELREQUIREMENTS-009}} (authorization). All interface requirements trace to their parent system requirements. Verification entries trace to the subsystem requirements they verify.

Next

Three of ten subsystems are now fully decomposed: TEWA, Track Management, and Weapon Control. The next highest-priority subsystem is {{entity:Electronic Warfare Subsystem}} — it connects to both TEWA (threat classification) and the Decoy Controller (threat warning), and its decomposition will close the soft-kill loop. After EW, the {{entity:Sensor Management Subsystem}} should follow to complete the sensor-to-shooter chain. The four lint findings from prior sessions should be addressed during the QC review phase once all subsystems are covered.